Investigation Confirms Jason Fletcher at Fault in Steven Taylor Murder

In a promising move of political and moral courage, the San Leandro City Council has authorized the release of the internal investigation report provided by the OIR Group, who were contracted to help clean-up repeated misconduct in the San Leandro Police Department. You can read it and the city’s press release.

In what was obvious to most residents, the report confirms that former SLPD Officer Jason Fletcher violated numerous department policies, failed to utilize several non-lethal tactics, and clearly violated the law when fatally shot Steven Taylor on April 18, 2020.

Let’s start with the essential conclusion: “Had a different approach been taken, the use of deadly force might have been avoided altogether.” [Emphasis added.] The report’s findings state this outright, actually condemning the actions of both Fletcher *and* Officer Stefan Overton.

Yes, you read that right! Now in this era of increasing cynicism and apathy, I confess to being stunned by this admission. Of course, local activists and organizers have been telling the city this for almost a year. (Myself included.) Still, to see it printed and published...? Admittedly, this is a low bar in the struggle for justice for Steven Taylor, but given what we’ve seen about how violent police are in America and how rarely they’re held accountable for their brutality, this is nothing less than a miraculous vindication. It’s also a sobering one given how far we still need to go.

That said, let’s dig into the specifics. Page 2 confirms the OIR Group had access to almost the totality of evidence involved in this case (which the city has separately confirmed will be released once appropriate redactions are completed), including 10 eyewitness statements, video footage, and forensics. Naturally, Fletcher refused to cooperate with the investigation as soon as his resignation went through, as noted on page 3 and later on page 6. (However, his interviews with other investigators were still available and my references to Fletcher’s statements should be viewed as such.) Additionally, Officer Overton is still employed by the department and so was required to cooperate or face discipline or even dismissal.

Page 4 presents a sanitized factual background of the events that day, but it’s on page 5 that we get a truly mind-blowing revelation — after Steven Taylor was shot dead center mass, “Officer Fletcher then initiated a third trigger activation of his Taser as Mr. Taylor dropped to the ground.” Yes, as he had been fatally shot after being tased twice by Fletcher and once by Overton, Fletcher tased Steven Taylor again as he fell down dying.

The report goes into further detail about this later on, but I want you to let this fact sink in. Taylor was shot, was falling down, had dropped the bat, and Fletcher tased him one more time. What kind of mentality do you have to possess to do something like this? What kind of disregard for human life? What kind of disregard for Black lives?

On page 6 we get to hear Overton’s side of the story for the first time, which reveals a lot of background information that I’m glad more people now can learn about him. Notably that he was a rookie and Fletcher was his partner. (Not mentioned in the report is that Overton’s parents are both former law enforcement too.) More importantly, it reveals the shocking depth of Overton’s inexperience and the dangers of his implicit bias allowed to become explicit, bigoted brutality. He saw Steven Taylor’s pain, confusion, unwillingness to attack anyone, and inability to lift the bat as a “bladed stance,” as being visually “locked in,” as an “angry glare.” Despite everything, Overton could only see a Black man who was unable to harm anyone as a deadly threat.

You can learn more about how this works from a study in 2014 entitled, “ Implicit Racial Attitudes Influence Perceived Emotional Intensity on Other-Race Faces." It also relates to a similar issue discussed later in the report.

(Tangentially and laughably, Overton also admits he doesn’t know the difference between the sound of a Taser and a gunshot on page 7. But I digress…)

Pages 8 through 10 go through other procedural questions. I found it most interesting that Overton never once considered any deescalation tactics beyond his Taser and the possibility of using his gun. Again, this reveals the mindset of why policing is so dangerous for BIPOC because cops are trained like hammers and everything is a nail.

Pages 11 through 12 finally gets us into Overton’s inability to recall that Taylor dropped the bat *before* Overton deployed his Taser. This is an important point because Overton argues that he deployed his Taser as part of active prevention of what he believed was imminent violence. However, as the OIR report makes clear, there was no such threat and that Overton’s memory is flawed. Though, it’s equally plausible that Overton is lying or hiding the truth to protect himself from accountability for tasing an innocent and dying man.

Beginning on page 13 we’re presented with the investigative findings for Fletcher’s actions on April 18. In careful detail, with citations to department policy and California statutes, the OIR group discuss Fletcher’s failures as follows:

A. Failure to wait for backup, page 14.
B. Failure to effectively deploy deescalation tactics, page 16.
C. Failure to deploy crisis intervention techniques, page 17.
D. Use of a Taser and firearm simultaneously in violation of SLPD policy and training, page 18.

Now, let’s circle back a bit. In the narrative for A on pages 14 through 15, we are reminded that Taylor made no move to attack Fletcher or anyone. Further, Fletcher’s brief exchange of words with Taylor made it clear that he was not in his right mind at the time. Meanwhile, OIR rightly points out that failing to wait for backup severely limited Fletcher’s tactical options that directly contributed to his gross escalation in the use of force.

In the narrative for B on pages 16 through 17, the report tells us that Fletcher apparently *was* trained in deescalation tactics, yet never used them. Indeed, Fletcher deployed his Taser twice without a verbal warning in violation of department policy. Even more incompetently, Fletcher himself chose to increase his proximity with Taylor rather than maintain a safer distance or create cover. While I quibble with the assertions that Taylor was a danger even with the bat (since he never swung it, even when Fletcher tried to grab it initially) or that he “moved toward” Fletcher immediately prior to being shot, OIR still sums it up rather nicely: “Fletcher failed to use time, distance, conversation, or other de-escalation tactics in his encounter with Taylor.”

In the narrative for C on pages 17 through 18, we learn that Fletcher had also apparently been trained in crisis intervention techniques. Yet, again, he did not use them at all when he engaged with Steven Taylor. This despite Fletcher clearly noting that Taylor was not “behaving rationally.” Again, OIR sums up the failure very well: “there is no evidence that Fletcher availed himself of any different tactics or approaches in dealing with those in mental health crises commensurate with the crisis intervention training he had received. As a result, all of the learning provided Fletcher that individuals going through mental health crisis may behave irrationally, not be able to comply with orders, and may react poorly to shows of force and barking orders was not implemented by the former officer in dealing with Mr. Taylor. Had a different approach been taken, the use of deadly force might have been avoided altogether.”

In the narrative for D on pages 18 through 20, we start with the very good reasons why officers are not supposed to simultaneously use a Taser and sidearm in either hand. First among them is the shameful but unsurprising incompetence that police cannot seem to distinguish between the two weapons. Fletcher’s excuse is as follows: “Fletcher told detectives that he kept both weapons out of his holster because of “exigent circumstances”. However, it was Fletcher’s actions that created those exigent circumstances. Had Fletcher waited a few more seconds before engaging with Mr. Taylor, he could have planned an approach with Officer Overton. As noted above, with two officers, one could assume the role of “lethal cover”, freeing the second officer to deploy a Taser. In fact, Officer Mally advised that this approach was part of the training that has been provided to SLPD Officers. The fact that an “exigency” created by Fletcher’s rushed engagement with Taylor does not provide a justification to go outside SLPD policy and have both weapons out of the holster at the same time.”

Almost pityingly, OIR attempted to give Fletcher an out by supplying the cop-out (pun intended) of an accidental discharge of his service weapon when he intended to use his Taser again after the first two attempts. “And while former Officer Fletcher denied that he mistakenly shot Mr. Taylor when he intended to deploy the Taser a third time, his mere denial is not sufficient to eliminate the strong possibility of a mistaken discharge of his firearm. There was little difference presented in threat level presented by Taylor between the second activation of the Taser and the use of deadly force, other than Taylor taking a staggered couple steps toward Fletcher.” Again, Taylor didn’t actually approach Fletcher at that point, but we’ll stay focused here.

Had Fletcher told investigators that he mistakenly fired his gun, this would put his crime down to involuntary manslaughter. But Fletcher insisted, to the detriment of his own case, that he intended to shoot Taylor based on his assertion that “He was too close, and I had already gone through two cycles with him. The efficacy of the taser declines after each time - each cycle that you go through. Um, and he had fought through two already. The second one seemed to affect him less than the first one. And he was still coming at me with the bat.” I suppose Fletcher figured he would get away with everything like so many other police officers who’ve killed Black men in America, and so he wasn’t all that concerned about this. Regardless, the report counters by noting that his “explanation, however, is inconsistent with his subsequent third deployment of the Taser.”

Then the report mentions this part: “[w]hile the prior deployment of the Taser did not have the desired effect of neuromuscular capacity, Fletcher admitted that it did have some observable painful effect on Taylor but that he had “powered through” the initial deployment.” Here we see the racist myth of the seemingly superhuman Black person who cannot feel pain. Notably, this is the same racism we saw with the murder of Michael Brown in Ferguson Missouri. It also relates back to Overton’s own implicit biases that turned into explicit, bigoted brutality. You can learn more about this from a great article in Psychology Today back in 2020 entitled, “The Myth That Endangers Black Lives.” 

Now, while later in the report (page 22), OIR grants Fletcher’s use of his Taser the first two times was reasonable (though we have no evidence that it actually was), they rightfully hone in on the third time he used the Taser. “The fact that Fletcher only fired one round is further evidence that Fletcher may have actually intended to activate his Taser a third time; officers rarely fire only one round when deploying firearms. Even Officer Overton mistakenly thought that Fletcher had activated his Taser as he came up on the scene based on the information he was processing. Perhaps most significantly in this regard, Fletcher did in fact activate his Taser a third time after he shot Taylor.”

If you’re inclined to give Fletcher the benefit of the doubt — despite every indication that you should not — this would be your *only* opportunity to do so. Because if Fletcher did really mean to use his gun, then, given his experience, training, and the record of events on April 18, this is actually worse than the charge of voluntary manslaughter. This is murder one.

Pages 20 through 21 focus on pertinent parts of SLPD policy to further evaluate the utter failure of Fletcher to utilize even the barest sense of tactical awareness or meet the lowest bar for use of force. This part is so well explained that I have to quote it in its entirety for context, comprehension, and clarity: “In this case, there were other options available to former Officer Fletcher. First, he could have waited for his backup officer to arrive, increasing the opportunity for planning, reducing the risk to both officers, and providing more tactical options short of the application of force. Second, he could have slowed down the encounter, using time, distance, reasoning, and other de-escalation skills in an effort to resolve the conflict short of force. Fletcher could also have taken advantage of his crisis intervention training and considered alternative approaches to immediately encountering Mr. Taylor and forcing the eventual conflict. Fletcher could also have created a scenario whereby warnings could have been safely and effectively conveyed to Mr. Taylor prior to deployment of both the Taser and the firearm. And finally, Fletcher could have deployed his Taser and firearm consistent with policy and training to avoid the possibility of mistakenly using one weapon when the intent was to deploy the other.”

“Former Officer Fletcher advised detectives that he used deadly force because the use of the Taser did not stop the threat presented and Mr. Taylor began to advance on him holding the baseball bat. Fletcher estimated that Taylor was three to five feet from him, but the video evidence places the two men farther apart when Fletcher shot Taylor.”

“Fletcher said the bat was down by his side, but that Taylor was beginning to bring up the bat. While it cannot be denied that a bat can be a weapon capable of inflicting serious injury, the fact that Fletcher found himself in the situation that he did, as explained above, was largely a result of decisions he made prior to the use of deadly force. It was Fletcher that chose to immediately engage Taylor rather than wait for backup, not maintain distance and a position of safety, not attempt to use de-escalation or crisis intervention tactics to defuse the situation and place himself in a position of peril. As a result, when Taylor staggered a couple of steps toward Fletcher, that forward movement could be perceived as a deadly threat. Even then, and perhaps because he was now holding both weapons, Fletcher apparently did not consider creating distance from Taylor as the man staggered forward, choosing to discharge his firearm instead.”

“Under a “totality of circumstances” analysis, precipitous conduct by officers that increases the threat to them should be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the use of deadly force. Here, there were numerous decision-points preceding the application of deadly force where Fletcher did not consider ways of handling the situation that could have precipitated a different result. As a result, former Officer Fletcher should be found to have violated the relevant SLPD policy regarding the use of deadly force.” [Emphasis added.]

On page 22 we get back again to that third use of the Taser. This is the part where the expertise of the OIR Group is clutch because, as they state, “[t]his fact was not realized by the investigators until after receiving the data analysis from the Taser manufacturer … This was on April 29, 2020 – eleven days after the shooting.”

Moreover, earlier in the report on page 19, OIR correctly identified a serious underlying problem with Fletcher’s cowboy tactics. “Former Officer Fletcher told detectives that he practiced with both weapons out of the holster “on his own” and had been provided such training by SLPD although he admitted that such use was not “preferred.” However, as indicated by Officer Mally, SLPD does not train officers to deploy with both weapons out of the holster. And it is improvident and contrary to the concept of unified procedures for an officer to “practice” a technique that is expressly disapproved in his agency’s policy and training.”

Nonetheless, “the third activation is differently situated and particularly problematic … Accordingly, Fletcher should be found to have violated the applicable provision of the Department’s “Conducted Energy Device” policy regarding the third deployment of his Taser.”

Pages 22 and 23 discuss a minor, but still critical detail of that fateful day that was mentioned in passing earlier in the report. Again, it’s important for context, comprehension, and clarity that I quote this part in full: “former Officer Fletcher was outside the back of the Walmart when he heard a radio call regarding criminal activity inside the store involving a man wielding a baseball bat. After Fletcher entered the store, he made contact with Mr. Taylor and immediately tried to take enforcement activity by reaching for Taylor’s arm and the bat that Taylor was holding. As he admitted during his interview to detectives, Fletcher turned on his PVRS when he parked his patrol car, but did not activate his PVRS until after he deployed his Taser. As a result, the PVRS did not capture the audio of Fletcher’s initial encounter with Mr. Taylor.”

“Fletcher told detectives that he did not activate his PVRS until after he made contact with Taylor because he had not expected to make that contact as soon as he did. Fletcher said that Taylor was much closer to the entrance of the store than what he had been told, and that, accordingly, there was not sufficient time to activate his PVRS.”

“Fletcher’s explanation for not activating his PVRS sooner does not align his actions with Department policy or expectations. Though he may have been surprised to be encountering Mr. Taylor so soon after entering Walmart, Fletcher could have, and should have, activated his PVRS as he initially responded to the call for service and made his way toward the store’s entrance. The radio dispatch provided information that an individual at the location was involved in “criminal activity” (petty theft upgraded to robbery). Officer Fletcher’s activating of his PVRS as soon as he received the call and began to respond to it, or at least as soon as he arrived at the dispatch location, would obviously have eliminated the issues of safety and impracticability that are recognized as exceptions to the policy requirements.”

“On this issue, the comparison between Officer Overton and former Officer Fletcher on their activation of their PVRS devices is instructive. Officer Overton activated his PVRS as he responded to the Walmart call and while still in his patrol car. As a result, there is a video and audio account of Officer Overton as he parked his car and entered the store. In contrast, because former Officer Fletcher did not timely activate his PVRS device, critical audio information regarding the encounter between him and Mr. Taylor were not captured. Former Officer Fletcher should be found to be in violation of San Leandro PD Policy 426.3 for his failure to timely activate his Portable Video Recording device.”

Yes, even a foolish rookie like Overton messed-up less than an allegedly experienced cop like Fletcher on the bare minimum of handling the body-cams our city made so much noise about back in 2014 when we allocated more money to SLPD to purchase them with the promise that they would supposedly stop incidents like this. Sadly, all they do is provide more evidence of how cruel and common they are.

Anyways, as could probably guess, Overton isn’t blameless either. Pages 24 through 27 go through his inappropriate use of force as well. We again see the Black superhuman trope deployed just as quickly as that Taser. “Officer Overton said that Taylor had walked away from the use of deadly force as if very unfazed by it, but that he saw Taylor fall to the ground after he deployed his Taser.” I really feel the need to ask: is this supposed to be the quality of our police officers? Because I’ve had less training in weapons and tactics and even I know the difference between the stopping power of a gunshot wound and being tased.

The report again highlights the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in Overton’s story. The bat wasn’t in Taylor’s hands before Overton’s Taser was deployed. Taylor was actually moving away from Overton before this too, “not in the apparent direction of any other individuals in the store … bleeding profusely and visibly from his gunshot wound” before Overton tases Steven Taylor again.

The OIR goes to painstaking detail to ensure there is no confusion about these facts and the totality of the situation when Officer Overton entered the scene. “The bat had fallen to the floor, Taylor had been grievously wounded and was moving away from the officers, in an apparent attempt to flee the weaponry that had been used on him. As detailed above, under SLPD policy, mere flight is insufficient to justify use of the Taser … Nor was there any information to indicate that after Taylor was shot, he presented a viable threat to either the officers or the other individuals in the Walmart, since there was no indication that he was otherwise armed and since the shot to his torso had neutralized any threat. Finally, Officer Overton did not provide a warning to Taylor before he deployed the Taser or consider use of other de-escalation techniques; if he had, he would have had more time to fully assess the threat level presented after his partner had shot Taylor. In sum, the threat level confronted by Officer Overton when he did activate his Taser had diminished past the point of its being justified or consistent with policy.”

Still, some sympathy is extended to Officer Overton, who was “sufficiently disadvantaged by the decision-making of his partner.” Still, this wasn’t enough to overcome the crippling combined weight of his failures: “We find that the facts establish that Officer Overton’s deployment of the Taser against Mr. Taylor violated SLPD’s use of force and use of Taser policies.”

In all my years looking at police reports, arrest records, use of force complaints, brutality lawsuits, and independent investigations throughout my career, I’ve rarely seen something so concise and so very damning.

It took two days less than a year to catalog and confirm what we already knew: Fletcher murdered Steven Taylor and Overton was the accomplice. Justice demands that Fletcher be convicted by a jury and that Overton is dismissed from the San Leandro Police Department to never work as a police officer ever again.

Take note and take care.